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Abstract
We build a fully microfounded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which is estimated
employing Bayesian methods. The model captures the most salient features of Austria as a small open economy,
the Euro Area (EA) and the United States (U.S.). Further analysis is conducted through numerical simulations to
examine how nominal and real shocks are propagated. Besides, welfare costs of nominal rigidities are calculated.
We distinguish two sample periods, ‘pre-EMU’ and ‘EMU’. In the former, we maintain the assumption of full
commitment of respective (independent) Central Banks towards their monetary rules, whereas in the latter, the
monetary policy of Austria is fully aligned with the European Central Bank.
Main results are derived from Bayesian estimation and simulation of the estimated model. Welfare calcula-
tions from the estimated model suggest that in the pre-EMU period, the EA and Austria present welfare costs
close to one percent of steady-state consumption, whereas the U.S. welfare costs is slightly higher (-1.52 percent).
As it would be expected, in the second subsample welfare costs in the EA decrease, indicating an improvement
in the allocation during the EMU regime (similarly in the U.S.), whereas in Austria welfare costs go up.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
On 1 January 1999 the third and ﬁnal stage of European Monetary Union (EMU) took place. That
meant that 11 initial member states joined in a Monetary Union by delegating rights to manage
their monetary policies on the European Central Bank (ECB). Greece became the 12th member
of the EMU in 2001 and currently, the number of member states grew to 15. This had at least
two results. First, nominal exchange rates of these member countries remained ﬁxed since 1999.
Second, though the Euro() started to circulate on 1 January 2002, since 1999 the ECB manages
changes in the repo rate, which is the main monetary policy (MP) instrument.
The current research in macroeconomic has placed a considerable eﬀort to extend closed econ-
omy macro-models to endogenize foreign economy ﬂuctuations and at the same time to account
for stylized features of the EMU as in Breuss & Rabitsch (2009), Pytlarczyk (2005), Benigno
(2004), among others. This paper follows that direction by fully modeling Austria as an small
open economy interacting with the EA and the U.S. as foreign economies, employing a consistent
three-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.1
The purpose of this paper is to estimate three countries’ deep parameters, to seek whether there
are substantial diﬀerences in ‘pre-EMU’ and ‘EMU’ regimes. In addition, we examine if those two
regimes’ estimates trigger meaningful welfare implications for Austria, Euro Area (EA) and the
United States of America (U.S.).
Our model provides novel evidence on deep parameters for these countries using Bayesian es-
timation methods. These estimates are further utilized to parameterize a model that is useful to
calculate endogenous variables’ responses to various shocks and compare shocks’ relative impor-
tance with Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). Moreover, we seek evidence on welfare
costs of diﬀerent nominal rigidities in speciﬁc countries. In particular, given any shock, the idea is
to check to which extent MP fulﬁls its stabilization role in Austria, in the EA and in the U.S.
The stabilization over the business cycle of output and consumption are crucial determinants
of the welfare cost. Therefore, equipped with our model, this paper intends to respond to the
following questions: What is the size of the welfare cost explained by nominal rigidities? And
what is the welfare costs derived from ﬁrm’s monopolistic power?
The distinction between ‘pre-EMU’ and ‘EMU’ regimes is very important. Breuss & Rabitsch
(2009) reported diﬀerent mode estimates for these periods, both for Austria and the EA.2 For
the U.S. case, there is ample evidence of a break in the MP management dated at the beginning
of 1984. Smets & Wouters (2007) employ Bayesian methods to estimate a DSGE model and
document two diﬀerent modes that arise from two subsamples identiﬁed as ‘Great Inﬂation’ and
‘Great Moderation’. These studies and stylized facts evidence from the data give us hint about
subdividing the sample and to obtain more precise estimates.
In the literature, we ﬁnd very few studies that build on three or more countries. For instance,
Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ (2005) have studied a model of three regions interpreting them as the U.S., Asia
and Europe that disregards their production structures by assuming exogenously given endow-
ments. Plasmans et al. (2006) propose a detailed modeling of a three country model, with a rich
production side: ﬁnal and intermediate goods (traded or nontraded). Our model draws on these
studies and, especially, on the two-country model of Austria and the EA by Breuss & Rabitsch
(2009).
We claim that three country models are more powerful and potentially more interesting than
1Although the present generation of DSGE models is not able to properly explain the outbreak of the present international ﬁnancial
crisis, it is a good instrument to study the implications of the political rescue measures (be it ﬁscal recovery packages or monetary
easing) announced by many countries in 2008 and 2009. However, lack of data due to normal release delay prevents us from investigating
crisis’s eﬀects.
2Mode estimates refer to the particular parameters’ values that minimize the log-likelihood function, we expand on this later.4
two-country models since we can study several transmission eﬀects with more institutional realism.3
The novelty of our three-country model lies in considering Austria is an open economy that interacts
with the EA and the U.S.. Since in many aspects Austria is bounded by EA policy, it is potentially
relevant for Austrian policymakers to understand the response of domestic variables to shocks with
origin in the U.S. and assess if these responses would diﬀer from those of the EA. To make more
clear the point, note that though Austrian export shares to the U.S. and to the rest of the EA,
on average represented 0.088 and 0.912 in the period 2000-2008, respectively, it is important to
point out that shocks with origin in the U.S. would surely not be buﬀered (and so fully propagated
into Austria) since the nominal exchange rate with respect to the rest of the EA members remains
ﬁxed.4
Our main ﬁndings come from analyzing the variance decomposition and welfare costs. First, the
general conclusion is that domestic shocks matter a lot for output and consumption in Austria as
well as in the foreign countries, in contrast foreign shocks are important for observed price inﬂation
and observed nominal interest rates. Furthermore, wage inﬂation variability is also explained
fundamentally by domestic shocks. Comparing consumption and investment variability, for Austria
and the EA foreign shocks trigger more the former than the latter. Second, our estimates of welfare
costs under the two regimes are similar to the obtained in the literature. For the pre-EMU period,
EA and Austria present welfare costs close to one percent of steady-state consumption, whereas
the U.S. welfare cost is above that number about -1.52 (we still report the negative sign since
it suggests a cost). In the second subsample, the Austrian welfare cost is the only one that is
magniﬁed; in the case of the EA and the U.S. these drop to -0.83 and -0.98 percent, respectively.
The structure of this paper is as follow. In section 2, we present basic assumptions regarding the
economic and institutional environment. Section 3 presents the DSGE model, covering consumer,
government and ﬁrms problems, equilibrium conditions and the net foreign assets accumulation.
Section 4 explains the welfare metric we apply. In Section 5 monetary and ﬁscal policy are speciﬁed,
while Section 6 introduces driving exogenous shocks and the normalization of nominal endogenous
variables. Section 7 deals with the data sources and with measurement assumptions. Section 8
discusses estimation results, while in Section 9 we concentrate in the salient features from the
simulation exercise. Section 10 concludes and appendix A provides main derivations.
2 The economic framework
This paper assumes that the world economy comprises:
1. a small open economy like Austria,
2. a large country that represents the EA, the major trading partner for Austria,
3. the rest of the world, proxied (for simplicity) by the U.S.
These economies are populated with representative inhabitants that are small in comparison
with the total population of the country. Our microfounded New Keynesian DSGE model pro-
vides us a suitable structure to analyze propagation mechanisms at work that may originate from
worldwide (common) shocks or country-speciﬁc shocks. For instance, we may investigate how
U.S.(EA)-speciﬁcs h o c k sa ﬀect Austrian macroeconomic variables and how the responses develop
3For instance, we can closely follow relative prices and nominal exchange rates ﬂuctuations when a monetary union is launched
among two of these countries –e.g., large-large or large-small– or among the three.
4Note that 1 is assigned to the ‘reduced’ world comprising Austria, the rest of the EA and the U.S.. Data taken from United Nations
COMTRADE database. For the sake of comparison, export shares of the rest of the EA to Austria and the U.S. are 0.252 and 0.748,
respectively.5
along time (which allow us to characterize propagation mechanisms at work). Further, we can pro-
vide insights on questions like: Which MP rule do minimize business cycle ﬂuctuations generated
from various shocks? How do asymmetric shocks inﬂuence aggregated prices and wages in Austria,
the EA and the U.S.? According to latest ﬁgures from the International Monetary Fund, the U.S.
GDP amounts to 23 percent of the worldwide GDP that would imply that whatever shock that hit
the U.S. economy has tremendous impact the rest. Consequently, our answers to these questions
are truly relevant for Austrian policymakers.
Before lying out the model structure, it is useful to comment on some institutional characteristics
of the aforementioned economies. Beginning with Austria, we point out that the wage negotiation
process is decentralized at the industry branch; however, there exists some sort of synchronization
since the metal-workers’ union is powerful enough to lead the annual negotiation, resulting in a
new wage that is taken as a reference to emulate by other sectors. The Austrian National Bank
(OeNB) manages independently the MP in the pre-EMU period.5 Since 1999, the OeNB ceased
to manage the MP which through its delegation to the ECB. Regarding ﬁscal policy, it remained
more or less discretional, but as convergence to the EA deepened, its management approximated
to an implicit zero-rule deﬁcit. It became even more explicit the rule after the commitment to
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which, in practice set upper bounds for the ﬁscal deﬁcit and
public debt.
The EA is treated as another country. Given the heterogeneity of the EA labor market, we
assume that the aggregation eﬀects reduce certain extreme wage setting cases such as, just to
mention one, the wage indexation rule that operates in Belgium. Furthermore, in EA the ﬁscal
and monetary policies are similarly managed as in Austria; however, the SGP can be thought of a
rule that applies to both the EA as a country (national level) as well as its members (subnational
levels). Finally, the nominal exchange rate w.r.t. the U.S. Dollar (USD) is fully ﬂexible.
The U.S. proxies the rest of the world in our model. It is widely accepted that the U.S. labor
market has a high degree of ﬂexibility and absence of intervention from the government. Moreover,
the literature in general states that the Central Bank of the U.S. (Fed) does not pursue an explicit
inﬂation targeting rule; instead, it aims to reach a double-goal instead: price stability and full
employment. Furthermore, it is hardly diﬃcult to sustain that a ﬁscal rule is operative at the
national level in the U.S.. However, balanced budget requirements are mandatory in many of the
U.S. states.6 For the U.S. case we just assume a zero deﬁcit rule and we will argue why it is
justiﬁed in Section 5.2.
To account for the wage stickiness consistent with institutional features mentioned above, it is
assumed asynchronized negotiation of contracts which is rationalized as in Calvo (1983). Similarly,
nominal prices are assumed to be sticky. The presence of rigidities is at the core of New Keynesian
DSGE models.
We assume that the OeNB (at least in the Pre-EMU period), the ECB and the FED are
autonomous in designing their monetary policies and they are fully committed to the announced
rules. In the next section, we present a model that accounts for these characteristics.
3T h e m o d e l
3.1 Consumer’s problem
In this section we characterize and solve the consumer’s intertemporal problem, where typically she
is concerned with consumption-saving decisions that would have both present and future welfare
5Strictly, the MP launched a peg anchored to the Deutsche Mark since 1981.
6For instance, Canadian provinces are constrained by budgetary balance rules, but it is not the case at the national level.6
implications. The second subsection examines the consumer’s intratemporal problem, where she
allocates consumption optimally so that the expenditure to buy varieties’ bundles is minimized.
To begin with, we assume that the -index identiﬁes a particular country of the world economy.
To make the presentation as general as possible, we employ set notation so that country  represents
an element of the set  = {}, denoting Austria, the EA and the U.S., respectively.78
In addition,  denotes the complement set of set , where particular elements of  are denoted
with prime signs, i.e., 0, 00, and so on. The complementary set is useful to simplify summations.
Regarding individuals that inhabit country , we assume that there is a continuum of identical
consumers denoted with the -index, so that  ∈ [0 ),w h e r e stands for a share,  ∈ (01),
because the worldwide population is normalized to 1.9 Notice that these shares are time invariant
implying that no migration is assumed.
Throughout the presentation of the model, unless stated otherwise, the domestic agent ’s op-
timization problem is presented, with the understanding that, unless stated otherwise, the foreign
consumers make equivalent choices.
3.1.1 Intertemporal problem
Agent  ∈ [0 ) has to choose how much he will spend today and how much tomorrow, given
her willingness to wait or patience measured by  ∈ (01). A key building bloc is the preference









































 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, κ
 and κ
 are scale parameters, 
 measures
the elasticity of money demand and 
 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, .10 The following
arguments enter in (1): consumption, real balances and labor eﬀort. Consumption appears in
its current as well as its lagged level altered by 0    1 (internal habit formation).11 In
addition, the period utility depends positively on real balances weighted by κ
, while it depends
negatively on the work eﬀort exerted.12 There are two shocks that distort Equation (1): 
 is a
shock to consumption preferences centered on one with standard deviation equal to 
 and 

is a shock that distorts the equalization of the intratemporal rate of substitution between labor
and consumption, speciﬁct oc o u n t r y. A positive realization of 
 is interpreted as a pro-leisure
shock, which is centered on one with constant standard deviation 
.
We assume that a domestic labor bundler combines labor varieties eﬃciently –like a competitive













7The EA is represented by 15 member states comprising Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and The Netherlands, whereas the U.S. is employed as a proxy for the world economy.
8The set  is ﬁnite but it might have any dimension.
9The individual  is representative or average in the sense that she shares a common preferences map as well as a sequence of budget
constraints. Hence, her choices (intertemporal and intratemporal) are similar as her neighbors’ choices.






. Observe that for our separable CRRA utility function 
=1 
.
11The introduction of internal habit formation rather than external habit formation is motivated by the study of Grishchenko (2007).
Using long-horizon aggregate stock market returns, she found that there is strong support for internal habit formation preferences,
which decays slowly over time. In addition, this feature adds realism to the model’s predictions (IRFs) and help explaining asset pricing
puzzles. In particular, IRFs are much alike than those obtained with an unrestricted VAR.
12Strictly speaking, utility depends positively on leisure time; however, as it is common practice in the literature to avoid non-




 stands for the nominal wage asked by employee ,  is the aggregate wage and

  1 is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between any pair of labor varieties. In
Section 3.1.1 we make explicit how to obtain the numerator of the relative wage of Equation (2),



















As a result, substituting 

















































where the wage 

 is choice variable because it is assumed that the worker has monopolistic
power over her particular abilities. Consumer  is confronted with two sequences of constraints































































































where in the LHS we group consumer ’s income allocations and in the RHS her sources. Beginning
with the LHS, since assets markets are assumed to be complete, the outstanding domestic bonds
holdings at the beginning of period  +1 , 
 (+1), are valued at prices at the end of period
,  (+1 ),w h e r e represents the state at end of period  − 1. Likewise, foreign bonds are
translated into domestic currency with the nominal exchange rates.13 As usual,  [·] stands for
the mathematical expectations operator, conditional on information set up to time .
Complete assets markets have been studied quite a lot in the literature.14 The basic result is that
consumers will derive the same marginal utility of consumption and turning the discount factor
 (+1 ) independent of . This is valid under two conditions: (i) consumers have a ‘common
knowledge’ of probabilities to get to +1; and (ii) observed assets’ prices are fair. Furthermore,
among all assets issued in country ,t h e r ei sa na s s e tt h a ti sf r e eo fr i s kw h o s et o d a y ’ sp r i c ei s1











 ∀ ∈  (6)
where  ≡ 1+, denotes country ’s gross nominal interest rate.15
In the LHS of (5) we ﬁnd nominal cash balances at the end of period , 

 and nominal private
consumption plus investment expenditure. Moreover, there are beginning of period holdings of do-
mestic, foreign bonds and money balances, the net of tax wage and net of tax capital income. Notice
that S


















13From Austria’s point of view, foreign bond holdings comprise: bonds issued in the EA, 

 (+1)as well as bonds issued in the
U.S., 

 (+1). To convert into the domestic currency we employ the corresponding nominal exchange rates:  and .













14For example, see Woodford (2003)’s model of the cashless economy.































where  is a shift parameter and 








−1 when capital is fully utilized.16 What is more, Pr

 stands for
nominal proﬁts that accrue to agent , which are non-negative because prices exceed marginal
costs, a common outcome from markets with monopolistic competition.17 Second, the law of
accumulation of physical capital reads as:



























 is an investment shock with mean one and (constant) standard deviation equal to 
.








,w h e r e

+ is
substituted by Equation (4), subject to a sequence of constraints (5) and (8).18 The resulting ﬁrst
order conditions for an interior optimum, henceforth FOCs, w.r.t. consumption, money balances,
domestic and foreign bonds, capital stock, investment and the rate of capital utilization (desired

































 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the nominal CBC, while the marginal utility




 ( w eo m i tt h eF O Cw . r . t . 

 since the CB man-
ages the interest rate). The optimality condition w.r.t. domestic bonds is Λ1
















where gross price inﬂation deﬁnition, Π ≡

−1, is employed. Similarly, the FOCs w.r.t. foreign


















 from Equation (9) and dividing by Equation (10) we get the following two UIP
















where the gross depreciation rate is deﬁned as  [∆0+1] ≡  [0+10].19 Notice that
the derivation of UIPs from the fundamental relationships of the model identiﬁes the ﬁnancial
16The FOC is Φ0 ()=
 exp[(

 − 1)]. Because of symmetry of consumers, at the steady state Φ()=0and Φ0 ()=
.
17We deﬁne aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms located in country  as Pr ≡
 
0 Pr
  where the representative ﬁrm is indexed by .





18Notice that at the equilibrium, Equation (5) is binding so that it is veriﬁed with equality.















linkages that connect the three economies under study. If the parity of interest rates holds for any
pair of countries, then there are no arbitrage opportunities arising from interest rates diﬀerentials
(indeed under complete asset markets any interest rate diﬀerential is quickly oﬀset by (an expected)
currency depreciation).
T h eb i l a t e r a lr e a le x c h a n g er a t ei sd e ﬁned as 0 ≡
00
 (∀0 ∈ ). Following Chari
et al. (2002), a formal expression for the real exchange rates result from solving an equality that




































2 are constants that depend on initial conditions. Likewise, four additional bilateral
real exchange rates formulae can be obtained; however, only three out of six bilateral real exchange
rates are independent.






























































































Finally, diﬀerentiation with respect to the Lagrange multiplier Λ2
, yields Equation (8).
Stickiness in nominal wages We assume that the consumer  supplies diﬀerentiated labor and
enjoys monopolistic power in setting the nominal wage. Calvo (1983) assumes that once the wage is
quoted, consumer ’s supplied hours work meet ﬁrms’ demand. In particular, Calvo wage setting
assumes that a new wage is set by agent  once she is entitled to do so, and this allowance is
materialized when she gets a random signal that follows an exogenous process. The occurrence of
the signal is a probabilistic event with constant probability 
 ∈ (01). When the agent gets the
signal, she chooses a wage, ˜ 

 , such utility (4) is optimized assuming that the nominal wage is
maintained ﬁxed until the signal is drawn again. Solving the problem’s FOC w.r.t. ˜ 

 , it yields








































 can be interpreted as the desired time-varying markup and (1 − 
)
−1 is a constant that
increases the wedge between ˜ 

 and the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). Furthermore, S
10
stands for a lump-sum subsidy –when greater than one– that (to some extent) may neutralize the
markup and lead to a competitive equilibrium. Recently, Smets & Wouters (2007) have suggested
that 
 follows an exogenous law of motion, speciﬁed as ARMA(1,1) process which captures the
very persistent wage markup’s evolution. This modeling strategy has a clear advantage in the
model’s estimation stage: it is easier to identify 
 than the elasticity 
 because the aggregate
data is not informative enough to capture the degree of substitution among labor varieties. Hence,























 captures the persistence, whereas 
 accounts for the memory of the wage markup
shocks. Notice that  is the (constant) long-run markup, 
(
 − 1).F u r t h e r , n o t i c e t h a t
the labor shock, 
, described above appears in the numerator. Expanding the summation in
the numerator and denominator, introducing the expectations operator and assuming symmetry,

































  + 

E [W2+1]
to exploit recursiveness.20 Finally, notice that the observed domestic aggregate wage is a convex
combination of the optimal wage determined by the Calvo rule and the wage quoted by those
agents that were not able to reoptimize at time  (who keep their salaries ﬁxed). Formally,
 =( 1− 





To simplify notation, we drop the subindex  since it is implicit that the intratemporal optimization
takes place at period .C o n s u m e r’s nominal total private consumption expenditure equalizes







































where  ∈  = {}, while countries 0 and 00 belong to .N o t i c e t h a t 1 is the
consumption share of home goods of country , while 2 and (1 − 1 − 2) are consumption
shares of imported goods by country , produced in countries 0 and 00, respectively. We allow for
diﬀerent degrees home bias (or openness) in consumption for each country. In particular, home
bias in consumption makes sense if 1  2  1  1
2 in Equation (19). Finally, the assumed
elasticity of substitution between any pair of tradable goods is constant and equal to   1.21
In Appendix A.2.1 we work out the optimization problem. Because of the perfect competition
assumption in intratemporal optimization problems, Lagrange multipliers associated with relevant
20Otherwise, inﬁnite summations from Equation (16) cannot be handled by discrete algorithms.
































(1 − 1 − 2)(00)
1−

































There will be nine demand functions. Moreover, in a three-country model, there are three
bilateral net trade ﬂows; however, two of them are independent because the world economy is
closed.22
Next, given the consumption aggregates from Equations (20)-(22) agent  seeks to minimize
expenditures
R 



















where  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties  produced in country  ∈  and   1.
Likewise, consumer  minimizes expenditures on imported goods.23 G i v e nt h ea s s u m e ds t r u c -





1+2(00)(00)00, subject to import bundles similar to Equa-













































where the typical variety is represented between brackets by an index (, 0 and 00) that accounts for
the place where the manufacturing process takes place.24 Finally, note that the implied Lagrange
22Likewise, there are three bilateral terms of trade and three bilateral real exchange rates; however, only two of them are independent.
Formally, terms of trade are deﬁned as: 0 ≡
0
 , 00 ≡
00





23Note that we follow the same logic to identify typical varieties, i.e., 0 and 00 are typical varieties produced in countries 0 and 00,
both of them belong to .
24In the absence of transaction costs, then the law of one price (LOOP) would apply. Thus, (0)=
(0)
0












































Demands for investment goods are similarly derived as consumption demands. The nominal





0 ,w h i c ha g e n t seeks to

































Proceeding in the same manner as with consumption demands, home and imported investment




































00, corresponding home and imported invest-








































The government solves a simple intratemporal problem to allocate its resources. The issue is how
to allocate the total nominal public expenditure  =
R 1
0 ()() by choosing optimally




















is a stochastic factor driven by , which has a data generating process that
reads as:







where  is calibrated so that the ratio  matches the data. Further, 
 is a shock with zero
mean and constant standard deviation 
.
The government is bound by the so-called government budget constraint (GBC), which states
that the genuine resources from the government must be enough to ﬁnance its expenses at any
period . Formally,
































































where   stands for the genuine taxes levied from various sources which vary over the business
cycle. Formally,




 [−1 − Φ()−1]+ (39)
where the income tax levied on ﬁrms is deﬁned as  ≡ 
[ ( +  + )+
0
0
0 (0 + 0)+( 1 −  − 0)
00




and average) tax rates applied on salary income, capital income and ﬁrm revenue, respectively.
Additional sources of government income is the net issuance of money and bonds denominated in







 (+1) 0 +
R 1
+0 00
 (+1) 00. In addition, (S
 − 1)
and (S
 − 1) are net subsidies to the private sector to neutralize the price and wage markups,
respectively. Finally,  stands for transfers (or lump-sum taxes if negative) to the public.
3.3 Firm’s problem
We solve the ﬁrm ’s problem in two stages. First, we solve the intratemporal problem that assures
allocative eﬃciency of resources (inputs). Second, we introduce the institutional framework that
conditions the pricing policy of the company, such that it maximizes the present value of the future
stream of proﬁts. Foreign ﬁrms solve equivalent economic problems.
3.3.1 Intratemporal problem: eﬃciency
Consider a representative ﬁrm  established in country , which is fully specialized in the pro-
duction of variety . To carry out the production process, it hires capital services (
−1)a n d
labor to eﬃciently produce  
 () according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function
that includes a ﬁxed cost of running the ﬁrm:













where 0    1.25  denotes total factor productivity, while 
−1 and 
 stand for the physical
capital stock at the beginning of the period  and aggregate labor eﬀectively demanded by ﬁrm
25As is constant this implies that the income distribution is kept ﬁxed throughout the analysis.14
, respectively.26 Technology displays decreasing marginal returns on both labor and capital and
positive cross-marginal productivity. Although the multiplicative part of the production function
is homogeneous of degree one, the addition of the ﬁxed cost turns returns to scale in technology
increasing, see Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2005).







 is a shock with mean zero and standard deviation 
 ,w h e r e a s measures the long-run
(constant) technology level.
Firm  is pricetaker in the inputs market, taking as given 
 and  per unit of time.
Moreover, it is assumed that all workers provide labor to each ﬁrm, being this information gathered




























 is the number of hours worked by agent  at ﬁrm . Given the technology, ﬁrm ’s











−1 s.t. Equation (40).
Optimality conditions lead to the equalization of the technical rate of substitution to the relative









where since the LHS ratio is a constant, it follows that all ﬁrms established in country  –given
the common knowledge of the technology– have the same technical rate of substitution. Resulting
optimal inputs’ demands are substituted back into the total cost function, from where we derive














which depends positively on nominal wages and capital rental rate and negatively on technology.
Further, notice that  is independent of the production level due to two assumptions: (i) Cobb-
Douglas technology coupled with constant returns to scale; and (ii) the augmenting productivity
process deﬁned in (41) is assumed to be ‘common’ knowledge.
3.3.2 Firm’s pricing
This section reviews the pricing strategy followed by ﬁrms that serve the domestic and foreign
markets. To simplify matters, we assume that either the ﬁrm targets the home market or exports
its production, and in any case, it specializes in the production of one variety.
26Notice that the technology process is a public good in country  and ﬁxed costs are similar for all ﬁrms, therefore we drop the
upper-index .
27The marginal cost is the partial derivative of the total cost function w.r.t.  
 .15
Beginning with those ﬁrms that sell their production at home, we obtain the demand by com-
bining domestic demands of variety  from Equations (24), (32) and (35) yield an aggregated
demand of variety , 




























which ignores exports to countries that belong to .28
Foreign demands, 
0
 () and 
00
 (), can be easily formulated given Equations (20) and (29).
We assume that the ﬁrm has no power to price diﬀerently if they serve other markets than the




 () and 
00
 () yield the global domestic
variety ’s demand which is equal to the ﬁrm ’s output,  
 ()+, according to (40).
Following Calvo (1983), ﬁrms are allowed to change prices when receiving a random signal.
Thus, changing the price is an event with constant probability of occurrence, (1 − 
),w h i c hi s
known and independent of previous (historic) draws. Under the hypothesis that ﬁrm  is not
allowed to reset prices in future periods, it seeks to maximize the present value of the stream of
future proﬁts, Pr
 ,s u b j e c tt ot h ef a c tt h a ti ts e r v e sv a r i e t y’s aggregated demand (or, as we
stated above  































 is the tax rate on ﬁrm ’s income.







,w h i c hi s-independent because assets markets are complete. Solving,





































 stands for a lump-sum subsidy –when
greater than one– that (to some extent) neutralizes the markup. Similarly as with wages, Smets























 capture the persistence while 
 captures the memory of price shocks processes. Recall
that + are not ﬁrm speciﬁc.
As Equation (47) contains inﬁnite summations, we seek a recursive form. Again, expanding the
summation in the numerator and in the denominator, introducing the expectations operator, it is
















is factored out of the brackets since the private sector as well as the government varieties’ demands have
elasticities of substitution equal to .
29Note the parallelism in the analysis that leaded us to redeﬁne variables in Equation (17). See footnote 20.16
























The observed domestic price for home consumption goods is a convex combination of the optimal
price determined by the Calvo price rule, Equation (47), and the price quoted by those agents that
were not able to reoptimize at time .W ed r o p in (48) due to symmetry, and taking into account
(27) it follows that the aggregate price reads as:

1−









We assume that exporters quote prices in exporters’ currency and that the law of one price
(LOOP) holds.30
3.4 Equilibrium conditions
In this section we elaborate on the aggregation of the macro-variables. First, we derive the aggre-
gate demand in the goods markets. Second, we impose equilibrium in the inputs market.
3.4.1 Aggregate demand
Consider the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of the home economy, deﬁned as the product
of the real GDP and the GDP deﬂator. Formally,




 ≡  +  +  + Φ()−1. The latter represents the country ’s aggregate
demand which comprises the sum of (deﬂated) domestic demands for private and government con-
sumption, investment, foreign demand of home goods (for consumption and investment motives)
minus what is lost because of the adjustment in capital utilization, Φ()−1.
A more detailed examination at  
 results from disaggregating it along the following two
aggregation dimensions. This is done in the following subsections.
Integration among agents Adding up agent ’s demands for any generic variety  –agent  stands
for any agent of the world economy– yields  (), which depends on contemporary ﬂow variables.
Next, we build an expression for  () integrating over agents.
Beginning with private demand, it follows that worldwide consumption and investment of the


































(00 + 00) (53)
30This assumption can be easily relaxed assuming that a fraction of exporters invoice in terms of the foreign currency. Adjemian
et al. (2008) estimate the share of ﬁrms that follow local currency pricing (LCP) or producer-currency-pricing (PCP) strategies. Their
evidence for the Euro area and the U.S. seems to favor the PCP strategy.17
where in the RHS we can identify the domestic demand and two foreign demands (exports)
with prices given by 0()=()0 and 00()=()00. In addition, we employed
per capita consumption aggregates deﬁnitions:  ≡ 1

R 























 + ()+−1Φ() (54)
where () comes from Equation (35), while resources lost by adjusting the capital utilization









In short, private consumption plus investment from Equation (53),  and −1Φ() com-
bined bring about the worldwide per capita demand for the variety produced at home, .31. Simi-
larly, in the following section we arrive at aggregates by integrating over varieties .
Integration among varieties  Notice that the procedure is not as straightforward as in the previous
section because there is price dispersion at the variety level that has to be taken into account.
Following Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2005) and to keeps things simple, we assume identical price
dispersions of any ﬁrm that belongs to country  no matter if it exports or if it serves only the












Price dispersion brings about ineﬃciencies in household consumption decisions because while
prices diﬀer, ﬁrms’ marginal cost is identical (given our assumptions on technology). Consequently,
price dispersion will not necessarily signal consumers to an optimal allocation, i.e., where consump-
tion expenses to buy a determined bundle are minimized.
To determine, for instance, the exact form of (55), notice that price dispersions are linked to































where (1 − 
)(
)
 is the share of resetting ﬁrms at time , while ˜ −() comes from (48)
after assuming symmetry. Extracting (1−
) from the summation and expanding it backwardly,
















31If  = 

















32Adjemian et al. (2008) distinguish among the market served for a certain domestic producer , meaning that price dispersion of
varieties sold domestically may diﬀer from price dispersions of exported varieties. That distinction in the modeling allows them to study
LCP.
33A similar expression is found in Di-Giorgio & Nistico (2007).
34As suggested by Woodford (2003) on page 399.18
where ˜ () i sg i v e nb yE q u a t i o n( 4 8 ) .I fp r i c e sw e r eﬂexible (
 =0 ), then ˜ ()= for all ,
thus ∆ =1a n dw ec o n c l u d et h a tt h ee ﬃciency condition holds. Under sticky prices, ∆  1,
thus consumption decisions will be distorted. Likewise, we may get ∆0 and ∆00.
Taking into account these price dispersion deﬁnitions, the RHS of Equation (52) can be ex-
panded in a consistent way. We concentrate on private and public demand. First, at period ,p e r
capita private demand (home and foreign imports) is given by Equation (53), which integrated



















(00 + 00) (57)







,w h i c h







where  is an exogenous process deﬁned in (36).
3.4.2 Aggregate supply and market clearing condition






























In equilibrium, the economy’s output, , equals the aggregate demand,  
 , presented in the



















(1 − 1 − 2)


















3.4.3 Assets and inputs markets equilibrium
Net assets holdings from the point of view of country  is deﬁned as F ≡
P
0∈( 00
− 00 ), where 0 = 
−1
0 by symmetry. It follows that in equilibrium (See, Adjemian
et al. (2008)):
F + F0 + F00 =0 
The capital rental market is in equilibrium when the demand for capital by goods producers
equals the agents’ supply at the price that clears the market, 
.35 As a result, the whole-economy
utilization rate  is determined as well. Moreover, the labor market is in equilibrium if ﬁrms’
35Note that if we would consider the case of capital treated as ﬁrm speciﬁc, there would be no supply of capital; hence, it does not
make sense to think of an equilibrium rental rate of capital.19
demand for labor equals labor supply at the wage level, , given by Equation (3). The interest
rate is determined by a Taylor rule that summarizes MP decisions (see Section 5.1). In the capital
market, equilibrium means that the government debt is held by domestic and foreign investors at
the market interest rate  ≡  − 1.
4W e l f a r e m e t r i c
In general, under certain conditions, it is possible to deﬁne an aggregate welfare metric for country




















+ is deﬁned in Equation (4). Thus, we can rewrite (60) –assuming that 



















where we assumed that the agent ’s consumption equalizes consumption of all other agents,
R 












  by ˜ ∆, which taking
into account (2) expands to:



















Proceeding similarly as in Section 3.4.1, in Appendix A.4 we show that wage dispersion has a


























 , ˜  ≡
˜ 















The intuition dictates that if wages are ﬂexible, i.e., 
 =0 ,t h e n ˜  =  and ﬁrms hire
the same amount of work from each agent, leading to no dispersion. Therefore, Equation (63)
simpliﬁes to ∆ =1and ˜ ∆ = 
1+

 . Given that agents consume the same and supply the
same hours of work, it follows that welfare equalizes individual utility: We = 

+.O nt h eo t h e r
hand, if wages are sticky (
  0), there is a dispersion of wages that makes ﬁrms hire diﬀerent
amounts of work from each agent, but since workers identical and have a similar MRS, it follows
that this ineﬃciency gives rise to a lower welfare level than when 
 =0(the competitive labor
market equilibrium).





































where ˇ  is deﬁned as ˜ .A s˜ ∆ enters into (61), we must not confuse it with ∆.20
However, it is diﬃcult to compare the levels of utility derived under diﬀerent degrees of rigidities
or alternative policies. Lucas (1987) and more recently Lucas (2003) pioneered in the quantitative
evaluation of welfare costs in terms of steady-state consumption. Given a particular monetary
regime, we measure business ﬂuctuations welfare costs as the permanent shift in the steady-state
consumption that would deliver identical utility if the ﬂuctuations were eliminated. In other words,
it is interpreted as the consumption that would be voluntarily given up by consumers to assure
hypothetical paths of stochastic processes that do not cause utility ﬂuctuations. Following Bergin
& Tchakarov (2003), we may compute the (conditional) individual welfare cost from business cycles




















































At the aggregate level, we seek to calculate  by employing Equation (61) in the previous




















from where it is straightforward to isolate :
























5M o n e t a r y a n d F i s c a l p o l i c y
In this study a key maintained assumption is that both the ﬁscal authority and the central bank
are committed to previously announced rules that make their behavior expected and anticipated
by the all agents. In the following subsections we analyze monetary and ﬁscal policy.
5.1 Monetary policy
Beginning with MP we assume that the home and foreign countries have independent CBs. These
monetary authorities manage MP instruments such as the short-run interest rate. As Taylor (1993)
have shown, a simple and parsimonious interest rate rule that targets inﬂation and the trend GDP,
could capture the behavior of the FED surprisingly well. The so-called Taylor rule is assumed as
given (that means that the design of MP was done in an early stage, and from that point in time
on, the Taylor rule has been fully operative and agents expect that it will maintain in the near
























pre-EMU, ∀ ∈ 
EMU, for  ={} 
(65)
38There are two approaches to calculate welfare, conditional –as followed here– and unconditional. That choice is justiﬁed because
the aim of this paper does not consider the issue of policy inconsistency, neither the commitment vs. discretion dilemma. See Bergin
& Tchakarov (2003) and Kollmann (2002).21
where  is the operative instrument of the CB that depends on the lagged nominal interest rate,
−1,C P Ii n ﬂation rates, , real output . In the EMU regime the OeNB does not manage
MP but the ECB does, so that  = .
Notice that all variables are measured in terms of deviations from their corresponding steady
s t a t ev a l u e s( t h e s eo m i tt i m es u b - i n d i c e s ) . F i n a l l y ,
 is a zero-mean innovation with constant
variance 2

, that can be interpreted as an unexpected money demand shock.39 The elasticity 

measures the degree of concern of the CB in managing the instrument in a smooth way. The lower

 the more concern is placed on the actual output gap and current CPI inﬂation ﬂuctuations to
determine the nominal interest rate. Notice that if 
 =0 ,t h er u l ei sk n o w na si n ﬂation targeting.
5.2 Fiscal policy
This section begins providing reasons for a plausible modeling of ﬁscal policy for Austria, the EA
and the U.S.
Firstly, Austria and the EA are obliged to follow the budgetary rules of the SGP since the start
of EMU in 1999. A reform of the Pact took place in 2005 (See, Breuss (2007)). In short, this
implies a balanced budget over the business cycle and that the deﬁcit must not exceed 3% of GDP
in one particular year
Secondly, in 1985 the U.S. federal government introduced deﬁcit controls through the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) law, also known as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deﬁcit Control
A c t . I tm e a n tac o n v e r g e n c et oaz e r od e ﬁcit in a horizon of six years, then extended to eight
years. Leaving aside Social Security, the eﬀort materialized mainly through spending cuts. A new
legislation complemented the GRH law to ﬁx some holes, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
(BEA) shifted the focus away from deﬁcit targets toward expenditure and revenue controls.40 Its
application was eﬀective till 1998 (when zero deﬁcit was reached) and further extended to 2002,
but in this latter period interval it was not truly operative. Overall, there is a consensus on that
this legislation improved ﬁscal discipline in the U.S..
In summary, any ﬁscal rule had as a common goal to put in practice –in a enforced way–, the
principle of healthy public ﬁnances that points out that it would be desirable to use debt ﬁnance
over the business cycle has been followed in several instances.41
Considering all aspects just mentioned, we assume that the transfer’s scheme will be the most
ﬂexible tool to react to business cycle ﬂuctuations. In particular, we will assume that transfers (or
lump sum taxes if negative) are set by the government according to a zero deﬁcit rule:





















which comes from the period GBC, Equation (38), under assets market equilibrium.42
6 Exogenous shocks and normalization
In this section we focus on two issues. First, we present the structure of exogenous variables
and shocks included in the model. Second, we normalize all nominal variables with the relevant
39Notice that  is inﬂation, whereas gross CPI inﬂation is deﬁned as Π ≡ −1.
40It was hard to control deﬁcit reductions ex ante employing the GRH law, because targets were applied to the projected, rather than
to actual deﬁcits.
41Indeed, the United Kingdom (U.K.) explicitly adopted this principle into the so-called golden rule.
42In Section 3.2 we described the diﬀerent tax rates applied; however, nothing was said about the fact that these are ﬁxed parameters.
Forni et al. (2007), for instance, allow for endogenous business cycle ﬂuctuations of tax rates and ﬁnd a great deal of persistency on
them; however, we follow the speciﬁcation suggested by Andres et al. (2006) because, under some circumstances, these ﬂuctuations
could lead to indeterminacy. Moreover, to change the tax structure often involves administrative costs and delays that need to be taken
into account. Thus, we would like to stress the permanent character of the rule and higher costs to modify it.22
aggregate price index.
Beginning with the structure of exogenous variables, the relevant vector for country  is deﬁned
as  ≡ (ln, ln, ln
, ln
)0 with mean  =( l n, ln, ln
, ln
)0, that implies
the world economy involves the concatenation,  ≡ (, 0, 00)0. These exogenous processes
follow a VAR(1) speciﬁcation:

































−1 to abbreviate notation. Likewise, the world economy
shocks vector is the concatenation,  ≡
¡
 0 00
¢0. To account for both temporary and
permanent eﬀects of shocks, we assume the following VAR(1) speciﬁcation:




























, 0, 0, 0) and Σ ≡ (Σ Σ0 Σ00).
The normalization assures stationary of all model variables. Recall that two key aspects may
cause nonstationarity of variables. First, nominal variables (e.g., prices) are clearly non-stationary,
so we must ﬁnd a way to rewrite them as relative prices. Second, if the technology process has a
unit root, we need to transform real variables in a way that include the technological progress that
drives them. However, in view of Equation (41), the latter aspect will not apply for our model.
The normalization assures that the steady state is well deﬁned, and is consistent with the
ﬁxed point deﬁnition. Thus we deﬂate all nominal variables in the model by the whole economy
price level, . To keep notation as simple as possible, we omit time subscripts (unless needed).
That means that all real variables in the model remain the same, while the following ones need
to be deﬁned:  ≡ 
 ,  ≡ 
 ,  ≡ 
 ,  ≡ 
 ,  ≡






0 ( ∈  and 0 ∈ ). Optimal prices set by following the Calvo pricing rule
as well as wages must also be deﬂated. Home producers will charge e () ≡
˜ ()
 ( ∈ ),
RP ≡
P1
 ( =1 2;  ∈ ), while real wages are f  ≡
˜ 
 , RW ≡
W
 ( =1 2;  ∈ ).
Moreover, real proﬁts are deﬁned as RPr ≡ Pr
 . Furthermore, we deﬁne the nominal exchange rate
depreciation rate ∆0 ≡
0
0−1 ( ∈  and 0 ∈ ). Finally, an additional transformation is























































































































Employing these variable deﬁnitions to substitute for all nominal variables, we are able to work
with a more reduced system comprising only real variables. This is nothing more than taking
the whole economy aggregate price as numéraire. These modiﬁed relationships included into the
model would not have any implication in terms of the equilibrium allocation, namely, the steady
state which is fully consistent in terms of real variables.
Conditional on the parameterization employed (see below), the modiﬁed nonlinear model equa-
tions are arranged in an implicit function with matrices as arguments:44
{(y+1yy−1v;)} = 0 (71)
where calibrated parameters are gathered in the vector , v are structural shocks that drive
exogenous processes explained in Equation (67) and y represents all endogenous variables of the
model.
First the model is solved at the non-stochastic steady state, so that Equation (71) at the
steady state becomes: {(yyy0;)} = 0. The nonlinear DYNARE solver running MATLAB
calculates the steady state.
7 Data and measurement assumptions
Data availability is quite suitable to estimate our DSGE model; the U.S. series start from 1954:Q2
to 2008:Q3, whereas for the EA we make use of Fagan et al. (2001) dataset in its most recent
update comprising EMU15 aggregates. Unfortunately, it is not available from the notes of the
eight update, the speciﬁc weights assigned to each of the 15 countries. Weights are reproduced by
Breuss & Rabitsch (2009) for the EU12
The working sample is conditioned by two facts that must be taken into account. First, following
Smets & Wouters (2007), we intend to identify parameters of the MP rule that are consistent with
the so-called Great Moderation (GM) for the U.S., meaning that the sample covers the period
1984:Q1-2007:Q4. Second, we must take into account the regime shift that the beginning of the
EMU implied; therefore, we divide the period in the pre-EMU period (1984Q1-1998Q4) and the
EMU period (1999Q1-2007Q4). As a result, we count with two samples of extension 1 =6 0and
2 =3 6 .
Observed variables that are nonstationary such as GDP, private consumption and investment
are transformed in per-worker terms (proxied by the labor force). Further, these are logged and
then detrended by employing the Hodrick-Prescott Filter with smoothing parameter  =1 6 0 0 .
44A transformation of variables is made −1 =  and −1 =  to make  and  endogenous and consequently
eliminate v−1 from the speciﬁcation.24
Regarding the measures of price and wage inﬂation, we calculate gross rates and detrend them by
the same method. Finally, nominal interest rates are in percentage points and we do not apply
any transformation on them.
Given these transformations, Table 1 illustrates stylized business cycle facts: relative standard
deviations (SDs) of our variables w.r.t. to output’s SD. The table is divided in three stacked
panels, Austria is at the top, whereas the EA is in the middle and the U.S. is at the bottom part.
Across columns Table 1 presents diﬀerent subsamples. In general, it is observed that consumption
is less volatile that output except for the U.S. in the period 1984Q1-1998Q4; however, in the whole
sample period it is lower than one. As Breuss & Rabitsch (2009) point out, this is a characteristic
of developed economies. Furthermore, investmenti si na l li n s t a n c e sm o r ev o l a t i l et h a no u t p u t ,
indeed a notorious fact is that investment of the U.S. is more than seven times more volatile
than output. For Austria and the EA investment volatility ranges from 1.6 to 2.7 depending
on the subsample considered. Our results based on per-worker consumption aggregates contrast
with results reported by Breuss & Rabitsch (2009). The EMU clearly lowered the volatility of
c o n s u m p t i o na sw e l la so fi n v e s t m e n to ft h eE A ,r e s u l t sw h i c ha r eq u i t er e a s o n a b l e .
Following with price and wage inﬂation, we observe that the former remains higher that the
other in Austria (the reverse is the case for the EA), whereas they are quite similar for the U.S..
Moreover, nominal interest rates tend to be more volatile that output, except in the EMU period
for Austria and the EA. Finally, the gross depreciation rate of  w.r.t. the USD is much more
volatile than the one for the Austrian Schilling (S) w.r.t. the . This is not surprising in view of
the early anchoring of the Austrian Schilling to the Deutsche Mark by mid 1976.
Table 1: Stylized business cycle facts from data
SDs of observed variables w.r.t. SD of observed Output
Country/Subsample Entire period pre-EMU GM GM, pre EMU GM, EMU
Austria
Output 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Consumption 0.806 0.847 0.788 0.851 0.721
Investment 2.355 2.654 1.755 1.922 1.626
Price inﬂation 0.356 0.393 0.360 0.444 0.272
Wage inﬂation 0.227 0.264 0.224 0.299 0.126
Nom. int. rate 2.486 2.136 1.999 1.625 0.976
Gross Depr. Rate (S/) 1.005 1.208 0.803 1.154 0.002
EA
Output 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Consumption 0.939 0.995 0.925 0.996 0.699
Investment 2.619 2.626 2.708 2.751 2.548
Price inﬂation 0.289 0.294 0.238 0.221 0.274
Wage inﬂation 0.470 0.505 0.426 0.468 0.327
Nom. int. rate 3.385 2.717 2.822 2.259 0.773
Gross Depr. Rate (/USD) 4.963 5.074 5.312 5.677 4.616
U.S.
Output 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Consumption 0.951 0.982 0.992 1.113 0.848
Investment 7.961 8.071 7.933 8.198 7.669
Price inﬂation 0.338 0.359 0.305 0.334 0.272
Wage inﬂation 0.328 0.349 0.342 0.408 0.263
Nom. int. rate 2.542 2.458 1.389 1.057 1.293
Table 2 reports cross-country correlations of home and foreign aggregates (for example, the25
correlation between Austrian consumption and consumption in the EA, and so on). Again, consid-
ering the GM sample and two subsamples: pre-EMU and EMU, the evidence suggests a sizeable
co-movement of Austrian and EA variables, especially output, investment and nominal interest
rates. It is noteworthy to remark that the price (wage) inﬂation co-movement rose (drop) to 0.625
(0.018) in the EMU period. When comparing the co-movement of Austrian variables with the ones
from U.S., we observe correlations close to zero (indicative of almost independent behavior) in the
GM sample, except for price inﬂation.
Table 2: Cross-correlations of Austrian variables w.r.t. respective foreign ones
Subsample GM pre-EMU EMU
Foreign country EA U.S. EA U.S. EA U.S.
Variables
Output 0.805 -0.025 0.865 -0.114 0.749 0.060
Consumption 0.522 -0.013 0.523 0.138 0.522 -0.285
Investment 0.767 -0.051 0.722 -0.526 0.876 0.525
Price inﬂation 0.439 0.256 0.346 0.226 0.625 0.317
Wage inﬂation 0.176 -0.129 0.207 -0.220 0.018 0.178
Nom. int. rate 0.940 0.422 0.914 0.028 1.000 0.458
Gross Depr. Rate (S/ and /USD) -0.059 -0.068 -0.040
8E s t i m a t i o n
This section brieﬂy provides some intuition on the estimation methodology employed. Then, we
provide motivation for the calibrated parameters. It is followed by the speciﬁcation of estimates
prior densities. Finally, we present results from Bayesian estimation.
8.1 Methodology
The model (71) is log-linearized around the steady state (ﬁrst order approximation, i.e., ˆ y ≡
y−y∗())w h e r e is the parameter vector. Sims (2002) suggested that the model can be reshuﬄed
in the following linear state-space system:
B1ˆ y + B2ˆ y−1 + Cv + D = 0 (72)
and solved employing a guess policy function. Consequently, (72) is handled with Sims (2002)’s
algorithm, which allows us to obtain the following solution’s representation:
ˆ y = Ξ0ˆ y−1 + Ξ1v (73)
Given Equation (73), a direct estimation approach would maximize its likelihood function with
respect to  and (Σ); however, we must acknowledge that not all variables included into ˆ y
are observed, a large number of them are unobserved. Hence, ˆ y ≡ (ˆ y
ˆ y
 )0,w h e r ei no u rm o d e l
ˆ y0
 has dimension 18×1 (pre-EMU) or 17×1 (EMU), for each  . Then, the complete state-space
representation adds to (73) the following measurement equation:
ˆ y

 = Υˆ y +  (74)
where Υ is a 18(17)× binary matrix that selects the observed variables from ˆ y,  is a measure-
ment error that is assumed to be  with mean zero vector and variance Σ.26
Denoting the sample as ˆ  




}, the density of ˆ  
 conditional on the parameters
















which includes a marginal density (involving the distribution of the initial condition) (ˆ y
0 |
(Σ)(Σ)) and a conditional density. Given our linearized model (73), (74) and our
deﬁnition of ,i tf o l l o w st h a tˆ y
0 ∼ N(∞ [ˆ y
] ∞[ˆ y
]).46 Concerning the second factor, the
conditional density involves the evaluation of ˆ y
 |  
−1 which is not directly observable since ˆ y












 | ˆ y(Σ)(Σ))
× (ˆ y | 

−1(Σ)(Σ))ˆ y
where the density of ˆ y
 |  
−1 depends on the mean of the density of ˆ y
 | ˆ y where the relevant
weight is the density of ˆ y |  
−1. The former density is directly given by the measurement Equation
(74), while ˆ y |  
−1 is computed by the Kalman ﬁlter.
8.1.1 Bayesian estimation: the likelihood meets prior densities
Bayesian estimation and evaluation techniques have been particularly successful in estimation of
not only small DSGE models but also medium to large-scale New Keynesian models. The estima-
tion procedure combines a likelihood function (75) derived from our model with the speciﬁcation
of a prior distribution for  ≡ ((Σ)(Σ))0. As a result, the state-space representation
can be translated to form the posterior distribution.
The idea behind the Bayesian principle is to look for a parameter vector which maximizes the
posterior density, given the prior and the likelihood based on the data. Formally, the posterior








where () is the prior density of the parameter vector, L(|ˆ y) is the likelihood of the data and
(ˆ y)=
R
Θ (ˆ y|)() is the unconditional data density, which, since it does not depend on
the parameter vector to be estimated, can be treated as a proportionality factor and accordingly
can be disregarded in the estimation process. Assuming  priors, the logarithm of the posterior
is given by the sum of the log likelihood of the data and the sum of the logarithms of the prior
distributions:
ln((|ˆ y





The latter term can be directly calculated from the speciﬁed prior distributions of the estimated
parameters. For the computation of the log likelihood of the data the Kalman ﬁlter is applied to
45Recall from Section 7, that we employ two samples 1 + 2 = .
46Construction of the likelihood for an AR(1) and AR(p) processes are derived in Hamilton (1994) Ch.5, Sections 2 and 3, respectively.
In case ˆ 
0 contains variables with unit roots, the initialization assumes an inﬁnite ∞ [ˆ y
], which is known as diﬀuse Kalman ﬁlter27
the DSGE model solution (the state-state representation) for the number of periods, ,p r o v i d e d
by the data ˆ y.
The (multivariate) posterior distribution for our DSGE model would not exist in closed form;
however, it can be approximated through a Gaussian density providing the sample size grows.47
Following Tierney & Kadane (1986), the posterior is understood as a kernel of unknown form,
K() ≡ K( 
), given that (one of) its mode is assumed to be known, ∗,t a k i n gl o g sa n d









−1 ( − 
∗)
where (∗) is minus the inverse of the Hessian of the model evaluated at the posterior mode.


















which enables us to approximate posterior moments, as derived by Kass et al. (1989) and Tierney
et al. (1989).
The whole point is that the asymptotic approximation ( →∞ ) makes sense if and only if the
true posterior does not diﬀer from the hypothesized Gaussian. More exact results for our sample
range can be derived via simulation given its non-standard shape, employing an approximation
method around the optimum that generates a (large) sample of draws using the Markov-Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. This is useful to characterize the shape of the posterior distribu-
tion, from which inference can be drawn. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is implemented using
a jumping distribution to visit areas that are not at the tails of the posterior. The validity of the
"jump" is assessed via acceptance-rejection instrumented with the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm,
where proposal draws that are accepted (rejected) are included (excluded) in Markov chain. The
researcher establishes the ratio of acceptance. The simulation is considered large enough when
pooled moments converge to within moments of the chain, see Brooks (1998).
8.2 Calibrated parameters and prior densities
The understanding that our model replicate processes over the business cycle frequency forces us
to keep some parameters calibrated because data is uninformative on them. We assume that the
(quarterly) willingness to wait, measured by ,i se q u a lt o104−025 and the quarterly depreciation
rate of physical capital, ,i sc a l i b r a t e dt o0025 (which is equivalent to 10 per cent per year).
Further, the shift parameter in the capital utilization cost function is assumed to be  =1 .
Moreover, parameters of the utility function are calibrated as follows: 
 =1so that consumption
enters in a logarithmic way, the reverse of the labor Frisch elasticity, 
, is assumed equal to 6
and scale parameters κ
 = κ
 =1as in Canzoneri et al. (2007).48 In addition, constants in real
exchange rates are assumed 
1 = 
2 =1 , as in the literature, e.g., Adjemian et al. (2008).







−1, are set to 1.2, consistent with substitution elasticities equal to 6.
What is more, moving average parameters of the price and wage markups, 
 and 
,a r ee q u a l
to 0.5. In addition, ﬁxed cost of operating the ﬁrm is ﬁxed and equal to 0.06 following Schmitt-
Grohe & Uribe (2005). The ﬁxed cost diminishes steady-state beneﬁts to more reasonable values.

 and 
 are calibrated to 0.95 as in Smets & Wouters (2007). In this version we shut down
47A st h es a m p l ee n l a r g e s ,t h ec h o i c eo ft h ep r i o rd e n s i t yw o u l dn o ta ﬀect the posterior.
48Galí (2008) in page 20 discusses the implications of 
 =1(no unemployment). This assumption allows us to present results on
welfare costs that are fully comparable in terms of steady state consumption units.28
completely ﬁscal policy, allowing for a zero deﬁc i tr u l ew i t ht a x e st h a ta r el u m ps u m( t a xr a t e s
are all equalized to zero). Government spending relative to GDP amounts to a share of 0.17, so





≈ 017.R e g a r d i n gM P ,w e
assume pure inﬂation targeting, i.e., 
 =0 .49 Remaining parameters are estimated.
Prior densities parameters are reported in Table 3. The choice of our prior densities draws on
the literature, especially Smets & Wouters (2003) and Smets & Wouters (2007). Beginning with
exogenous stochastic processes, we assume that innovations’ SDs are distributed following inverted
gamma processes and consider three homogeneous groups: (i) more loose distributions, i.e., with
mean 0.1 and 2 degrees of freedom (df), for technology, money demand, preferences, investment
and labor eﬀort; (ii) markups shocks are distributed with mean 0.01 and 1 df; and (iii) government
spending shocks that disturb very little  are speciﬁed with mean 0.005 and 1 df. Moreover,
all persistence parameters of AR(1) processes are beta-distributed with means 0.75 and SDs 0.1.
Regarding policy, prior densities for the inﬂation targeting MP parameters where chosen as in
t h el i t e r a t u r ew h e r et h eC B ’ sr e a c t i o no ni n ﬂation is normally distributed with mean 1.5 and SD
0.125. The prior on the parameter  which measures a shift in the cost of adjusting the utilization
rate of physical capital follows a normal distribution (N)w i t hm e a n1a n dS Do f0 . 1 5( A d j e m i a n
et al. (2008) employ a gamma distribution). Moreover, the investment adjustment friction, Ψ,i s
normally distributed with mean 8 and SD equal to 2. Capital share is assumed to be distributed as
beta () with mean 0.24 and standard error 0.05. Calvo wage stickiness is consistent with a prior
probability 
, beta-distributed with mean 05 and standard deviation 0.2 as it was suggested by
Bils & Klenow (2004). Identical parameterization of the beta distribution is made for 
.T h e s e
priors mean that ap r i o r ihypotheses are that prices and wages are reset on average twice a year.
The internal habit formation parameter is assumed to be beta-distributed with mean 0.4 and SD
0.2 (Adolfson et al. (2008)). Finally, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
aggregates is inverted gamma distributed with mean 1.5 and 4 df (Adolfson et al. (2008)).
8.3 Characterization of posterior estimates
The set of posterior estimated parameters for our two subsample periods, namely, pre-EMU and
EMU, is reported in Table 3. Posterior densities result from 250,000 replications (from were we
disregard initial 50,000 values (20 percent) to avoid arbitrary results due to initialization).50
Beginning with the list of persistence parameters, we observe that: (i) technology process for
Austria displays roughly the same value across subsamples (for example, 
 =0 61 implies that
the shock dies completely out in 2.58 quarters), whereas for the EA and the U.S. these are more
persistent for the EMU period (for the EA the increase represents more than 12 percent); (ii) the
MP persistence seems to be similar for Austria and the U.S., but slightly less persistent for the EA
in the pre-EMU sample, whereas in the EMU regime estimates of the EA and the U.S. indicate
less persistency (naturally we do not observe this parameter for Austria in the second period since
its MP is managed by the ECB); (iii) estimates of government spending persistency are among
the largest reported and remain robust across regimes with values ranging from 0.77 to 0.88 and,
not surprisingly, estimates for Austria and the EA are quite similar; (iv) estimates of preference
shock persistence are higher in the second regime –in the case of Austria it rises 13 percent, but
for the EA and the U.S. variations represent more than 35 percent–; (v) estimates of investment
persistency are found to be among the most persistent, in general these estimates marginally diﬀer
49Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2005) and Paustian & von Hagen (2008) report that inﬂation targeting performs better in terms of welfare
than the Taylor rule. In particular, Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2005) ﬁnd that the simple rule that could sustain the Ramsey equilibrium,
should also react to wage inﬂation with almost mute response to output gap. We do not try wage rules since CBs in practice are not
explicitly targeting wage inﬂation.
50Mode vectors and checks as well as posterior distributions graphs are available on request from the authors.29
across periods, with the exception of the Austrian estimate that goes down from 0.94 to 0.87; and
(vi) estimates of the labor eﬀort shock persistency seem to present similar patterns across regimes
for Austria; however, the estimates increase in the EMU period for the EA and the U.S.: the
latter’s estimate is the one that varies the most (from 0.52 to 0.62).
We also report in Table 3 estimates of ARMA(1,1) markup processes. Autoregressive parts
of these processes –estimates of persistency– range from 0.62 to 0.88 and are remarkably the
same and robust for Austrian price and wage markups; however, we observe some changes across
regimes in the other countries: (i) U.S. price markups estimates decrease from 0.88 to 0.75 and
(ii) EA wage markups estimates decrease from 0.65 to 0.62. Regarding the parameters of the
MA(1) representation, estimates do not display a clear pattern. Estimates for Austrian wages (but
not prices) seem to be quite robust across regimes. We ﬁnd a substantial increase in price MA
parameters of markups for the U.S..
Regarding MP parameters, we ﬁnd that OeNB and ECB are more sensitive to ﬂuctuations of
inﬂa t i o nt h a nt h eF E D .I nf a c t ,t h ep e r i o d( e ﬀective) reaction parameter to inﬂation ﬂuctuations
results from (1 − 
)
, which in the pre-EMU sample amounts to values of 0.56 for Austria,
0.63 for the EA and 0.44 for the U.S.. In the EMU period, the latter two increase to 0.71 and
0.58, respectively. In accordance with Breuss & Rabitsch (2009), we ﬁnd that 
 and 
 decrease
in the EMU subsample. The shift in the utilization cost seems to be higher for Austria and the
EA than for the U.S. which is observed close to 1. An interpretation valid for the U.S. is that
as 
 → 
 (since  → 1) it conveys evidence on a more perfect functioning of capital rental
markets. Estimates of  are 1.17 and 1.24 (about 20 percent higher than the prior) in the Euro Area
and Austria, respectively. These values decrease in the EMU period to 1.08 and 1.14, respectively.
Moreover, adjustment costs of new investment for all countries are estimated above the prior mean,
especially in the pre-EMU sample (in the case of Austria, e.g., the estimate is 15.47 about two-
times the prior mean). For the EMU subsample estimates are lower: 13.32 for Austria, 11.84 for
the EA and 11.13 for the U.S.. Notice that the evidence points to lower frictions in investment
in the EMU period for Austria and the EA (whereas for the U.S. remains the same) suggesting
am o r eb e n e ﬁcial environment for investment in the EMU subsample. Moreover, estimates of
nominal rigidities (Calvo parameters) of prices and wages lead us to calculate estimated durations




which results in 2.41 quarters (2.94 in the EMU era), while for the EA and the U.S. these are 2.85
(3.28) and 4.96 (3.77) quarters, respectively. These results seem quite diﬃcult to interpret, since
one would expect that evidence on more rigid prices would be supported by data. In addition, the
same method leads us to estimate (average) wage contracts durations of the three countries. For
Austria, these are 5.18 and 7.96 quarters in the pre-EMU and EMU subsamples, for the EA these
are 2.74 and 3.78 quarters and for the U.S. 4.27 and 5.3, respectively. Again, these results are quite
surprising.51 The general picture suggests larger nominal rigidities in wages in the EMU subsample
which is to some extent worrisome for the EA due to the fact it necessitates wage ﬂexibility to ease
the adjustment of the real exchange rate. Moreover, internal habit formation estimates are quite
stable and similar for all countries and these imply sizeable persistency in consumption. Finally,
the elasticity of substitution  is (surprisingly) estimated lower than one indicating that home
and imported variety bundles are complements. During the EMU period, these elasticities increase
at least by a factor of 1.44 regardless the country considered (it is 1.63 in Austria, 1.49 in the EA
and 1.44 for the U.S.).
Continuing with Table 3, SD estimates are also reported. These contribute to explain business
cycle ﬂuctuations which are driven by labor shocks, wage markup shocks, preference shocks and
51Probably the idea of similar prior distributions must be revised in future work to correct this pattern. Previous estimates of two
country models suggest the opposite results: more rigidity is found in the EA than in the U.S.; nonetheless, we are not aware of evidence
from three-country models.30
investment shocks. In fact, labor eﬀort shock (and not much wage markup shock), investment,
technology and preference shocks seem to matter the most for the U.S. in the pre-EMU period (in
t h eE M Up e r i o dl a b o ra n dt e c h n o l o g ys h o c k sa r el e s si m p o r t a n t ,w h e r e a st h eo t h e r sr e m a i nm a r -
ginally more relevant). Moreover, investment, labor eﬀort and preference shocks are particularly
important for the EA in the pre-EMU regime and still remain important during the EMU regime,
though SD estimates have lower values. Finally, for Austria labor, MP and preference shocks seem
to be most important.31
Table 3: Bayesian estimation results
Parameters Prior densities Posteriors, Pre-EMU Posteriors, EMU
Type Mean S.D. Mean 0.05 0.95 Mean 0.05 0.95
Tech. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.591 0.481 0.706 0.606 0.483 0.730
Tech. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.569 0.423 0.723 0.640 0.525 0.757
Tech. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.570 0.408 0.736 0.615 0.469 0.763
MP persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.668 0.609 0.726
MP persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.603 0.538 0.673 0.565 0.478 0.653
MP persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.677 0.611 0.742 0.572 0.491 0.658
Gov. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.878 0.809 0.949 0.863 0.793 0.939
Gov. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.873 0.794 0.949 0.886 0.824 0.955
Gov. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.793 0.698 0.890 0.784 0.665 0.904
Pref. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.694 0.568 0.810 0.786 0.666 0.910
Pref. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.387 0.256 0.516 0.558 0.405 0.707
Pref. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.386 0.250 0.523 0.522 0.346 0.694
Inv. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.942 0.913 0.972 0.874 0.803 0.946
Inv. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.902 0.864 0.940 0.902 0.849 0.957
Inv. shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.895 0.841 0.950 0.861 0.793 0.931
Labor shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.769 0.693 0.851 0.763 0.638 0.889
Labor shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.617 0.393 0.816 0.665 0.490 0.844
Labor shock persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.517 0.327 0.722 0.619 0.475 0.769
MA price markup persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.721 0.561 0.885 0.747 0.594 0.910
MA price markup persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.726 0.570 0.893 0.759 0.602 0.923
MA price markup persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.883 0.698 0.989 0.751 0.595 0.917
MA wage markup persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.756 0.607 0.910 0.750 0.595 0.914
MA wage markup persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.651 0.454 0.841 0.621 0.438 0.812
MA wage markup persistence 
  0.75 0.1 0.748 0.588 0.914 0.751 0.595 0.907
MA price markup parameter 
  0.5 0.2 0.584 0.279 0.913 0.507 0.192 0.833
MA price markup parameter 
  0.5 0.2 0.554 0.227 0.893 0.501 0.178 0.802
MA price markup parameter 
  0.5 0.2 0.334 0.018 0.669 0.478 0.148 0.805
MA wage markup parameter 
  0.5 0.2 0.491 0.155 0.814 0.491 0.156 0.818
MA wage markup parameter 
  0.5 0.2 0.758 0.554 0.968 0.779 0.620 0.937
MA wage markup parameter 
  0.5 0.2 0.513 0.184 0.837 0.495 0.162 0.815
MP reaction to inﬂation 
 N 1.5 0.125 1.683 1.377 1.971
MP reaction to inﬂation 
 N 1.5 0.125 1.584 1.311 1.835 1.623 1.428 1.814
MP reaction to inﬂation 
 N 1.5 0.125 1.373 1.000 1.881 1.366 1.172 1.552
Shift param. utilization cost  N 1 0.15 1.178 0.952 1.395 1.083 0.849 1.322
Shift param. utilization cost  N 1 0.15 1.236 1.016 1.464 1.144 0.915 1.382
Shift param. utilization cost  N 1 0.15 1.005 0.761 1.247 0.988 0.745 1.235
Param. investment cost Ψ N 8 2.5 15.471 12.441 18.804 13.320 10.191 16.449
Param. investment cost Ψ N 8 2.5 13.435 10.074 16.385 11.847 8.609 15.147
Param. investment cost Ψ N 8 2.5 11.633 8.126 15.047 11.138 7.911 14.419
Calvo price 
  0.5 0.15 0.586 0.513 0.653 0.660 0.603 0.717
Calvo price 
  0.5 0.15 0.649 0.591 0.714 0.695 0.635 0.754
Calvo price 
  0.5 0.15 0.799 0.625 0.954 0.735 0.658 0.81432
Table 3: Bayesian estimation results (continuation)
Parameters (cont.) Prior densities Posteriors, Pre-EMU Posteriors, EMU
Type Mean S.D. Mean 0.05 0.95 Mean 0.05 0.95
Calvo wage 
  0.5 0.15 0.807 0.751 0.868 0.874 0.819 0.930
Calvo wage 
  0.5 0.15 0.636 0.530 0.741 0.735 0.632 0.844
Calvo wage 
  0.5 0.15 0.766 0.688 0.848 0.811 0.749 0.875
Habit formation   0.5 0.2 0.935 0.924 0.946 0.939 0.923 0.955
Habit formation   0.5 0.2 0.934 0.924 0.945 0.926 0.911 0.941
Habit formation   0.5 0.2 0.925 0.911 0.938 0.921 0.900 0.942
Inverse Frisch elast. 
 N 2 0.5 1.980 1.289 2.674 1.679 0.971 2.404
Inverse Frisch elast. 
 N 2 0.5 2.078 1.419 2.769 1.854 1.249 2.462
Inverse Frisch elast. 
 N 2 0.5 2.384 1.647 3.163 1.983 1.327 2.611
Elasticity of subst.  Γ−1 1.5 4 0.367 0.270 0.461 0.596 0.356 0.831
Elasticity of subst.  Γ−1 1.5 4 0.413 0.289 0.528 0.616 0.353 0.864
Elasticity of subst.  Γ−1 1.5 4 0.365 0.274 0.455 0.524 0.338 0.700
Standard Errors of Shocks Prior densities Posteriors, Pre-EMU Posteriors, EMU
Type Mean df Mean 0.05 0.95 Mean 0.05 0.95
Technology 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.019 0.015 0.024 0.025 0.019 0.032
Technology 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.020 0.015 0.024 0.020 0.015 0.025
Technology 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.044 0.022 0.068 0.036 0.021 0.051
Money demand 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.024 0.019 0.029
Money demand 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.035 0.028 0.042 0.020 0.016 0.024
Money demand 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.023 0.018 0.028 0.021 0.016 0.026
Preferences 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.021 0.017 0.026 0.025 0.018 0.032
Preferences 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.036 0.029 0.043 0.025 0.019 0.031
Preferences 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.033 0.025 0.040 0.037 0.026 0.048
Investment 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.018 0.015 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.027
Investment 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.031 0.026 0.036 0.023 0.019 0.028
Investment 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.054 0.046 0.063 0.056 0.045 0.068
Labor eﬀort 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.045 0.027 0.063 0.066 0.027 0.101
Labor eﬀort 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.039 0.020 0.059 0.035 0.020 0.050
Labor eﬀort 
 Γ−1 0.1 2 0.094 0.025 0.165 0.080 0.040 0.118
Price markup 
 Γ−1 0.01 1 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.007
Price markup 
 Γ−1 0.01 1 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.008
Price markup 
 Γ−1 0.01 1 0.032 0.003 0.065 0.008 0.002 0.014
Wage markup 
 Γ−1 0.01 1 0.007 0.002 0.012 0.009 0.002 0.016
Wage markup 
 Γ−1 0.01 1 0.089 0.003 0.132 0.093 0.046 0.153
Wage markup 
 Γ−1 0.01 1 0.009 0.002 0.018 0.008 0.002 0.015
Gov. spending  Γ−1 0.005 1 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005
Gov. spending  Γ−1 0.005 1 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Gov. spending  Γ−1 0.005 1 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005
Note: Upper-indices A, E and U stand for Austria, the EA and the U.S., respectively. Moreover, ‘df’ is
the abbreviation of degrees of freedom.33
9S i m u l a t i o n r e s u l t s
In this section we present simulations once the model is parameterized with estimated values. We
examine in turn IRFs, the variance decomposition and welfare implications.
9.1 Impulse response functions
The DSGE model (71) is solved and simulated employing a second order approximation following
Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2003)’s method in the neighborhood of the steady state of the model that
is parameterized with estimated parameters. The policy function that solves the model depends
also on variances of shocks:









−1Ev + ∆Σv (78)
where coeﬃcients on state (exogenous) variables are contained in A (B), cross products of state
(exogenous) variables are in C (D) and cross-product of the state and exogenous variables are in
E.F i n a l l y ,∆ contains shocks’ variances. Notice that this method allows us to depart from the
certainty equivalence principle (that holds under ﬁrst order approximation).52
This section brieﬂy describes impulse response functions of various shocks of Austrian, EA and
U.S. origin considered in our model. To facilitate the interpretation the size of the shock impulses
are of one percent and we report responses for the two regimes considered, namely, pre-EMU and
EMU regimes. The former is represented with responses without markers, while EMU subsample
r e s p o n s e sa r ed e n o t e dw i t ht h e m .D a s h e db l a c kl i n e s(-----)r e p r esent Austria, dashed with
dot blue lines(- . - . -) the EA and full magenta lines (––—) the U.S..
Figures 1 to 3 illustrate IRFs calculated from shocks occurring in Austria, the EA and the U.S.,
respectively. Beginning with the ﬁrst row in Figure 1, a one percent shock in technology makes
Austrian output go up in both regimes as in Breuss & Rabitsch (2009). Due to spillover eﬀects
channeled through trade, the EA and the U.S. outputs also react positively, but these eﬀects are
much short-lived in comparison with Austria’s GDP. In particular, notice that the estimated IRF
for the EMU regime is shifted upward. Austrian consumption goes up in the EMU period, while it
goes up ﬁrstly, but then turns negative in pre-EMU sample period. Foreign countries’ consumption
all go down (with the exception of the EA in the EMU regime). Investment goes up in all countries
because of the loosening of MP managed by the CBs; clearly Austrian investment react the most.
Finally, hours worked in Austria go down, which is consistent with the productivity shock that
saves inputs, whereas in the foreign countries hours worked go in the opposite direction.
In the second row of Figure 1 we ﬁnd the impulse responses of a MP shock that decreases
the interest rates in the Euro Area (in this particular case we do not consider Austria, since its
MP is unobservable during the second regime). As a result in the EMU subsample, Austrian
and EA GDPs go similarly up, while in the pre-EMU period Austrian GDP does not change
much due to the fact that the nominal exchange rate is ﬂexible and it reacts as a shock absorber.
The U.S. GDP goes down under both regimes, displaying a more deeply response in the pre-
EMU period. Consumption patterns are quite persistent due to large habit formation parameter
estimates, showing reactions that go in the same direction as GDP. Investment reacts positively
52Strictly speaking the procedure is not entirely correct, as an estimation of at least 2nd order approximation of the model must be
taken to the the data. Such an estimation strategy involves the use of the Particle ﬁlter which would surely lead to diﬀerent parameter
results (and as a result to diﬀerent numbers for welfare costs), see Fernandez-Villaverde & Rubio-Ramirez (2006).
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2006) have shown that 2nd order approximation errors in the solution of the model have ﬁrst order
eﬀects on the likelihood function and error’s magnitudes compound with the size of the sample. In conclusion the likelihood implied by
the linearized model diverges from the likelihood implied by 2nd order and this, in turn, from the exact model.
Their proposed solution is simply not yet feasible for large scale models. This fact constrained us to employ our estimates obtained
with a linear Kalman ﬁlter in parameterizing another model version, which is solved with 2nd a order approximation and ultimately it
is simulated.34
quite a bit to this interest rate drop, especially in the very short-run (until the 10th quarter) and
then stabilizes. Hours worked display a very similar pattern as of GDP.
Figure 1: IRFs of shocks with origin in Austria
The third row of Figure 1 illustrates a one percent positive preference shock that occurs in35
Austria. The impact on Austria is by large the most relevant in domestic GDP an also it spreads
(not surprisingly) over the EA. The trade channel explains what we observe in the second chart,
where solely consumption in Austria is fully responsive for this shock; the EA consumption does
not react much; in fact, that response would not be easily distinguished from the U.S. consumption.
Austrian investment reacts more positively in the EMU regime than in the pre-EMU. Again, the
c h a r to fh o u r sw o r k e dd e p i c t sap i c t u r ev e r ys i m i l a ra so ft h eo n ef o rG D P .
The fourth row of Figure 1 displays how is the response of GDP, consumption, investment and
hours worked to a one percent shock in investment (the shock turns less expensive to install new
investment).53 Our results are very similar to those obtained by Breuss & Rabitsch (2009), though
our speciﬁcation slightly diﬀers. The result is that Austrian investment goes up, while consumption
goes down. These eﬀects compensate, but since the investment one is more important, it dominates
the expansion in the Austrian GDP. Again, hours worked depict a picture very similar as of the
one for GDP.
The ﬁfth row of Figure 1 illustrates a positive labor supply shock, in the sense that employees
are less willing to enjoy their free time. This is one of the more interesting shocks to analyze since
invariably consumption goes up. The autonomous MP pursued by the OeNB increases the interest
rate so that investment in the pre-EMU period reacts more. If the same shock takes place, in the
EMU regime our estimates show that the ECB is not as successful as before; this is reasonable since
it sets MP for the whole EA. For that reason, adding investment and consumption eﬀects, lead
to an interesting result: Austrian output IRFs in the two samples cross around the 14th quarter.
H o u r sw o r k e di n c r e a s ei nA u s t r i a ,a si ti se x p e c t e d .
The sixth and seventh rows of Figure 1 illustrate responses of price and wage markups shocks
with origin in Austria. As usual, output goes up in Austria since these shocks can be rationalized as
negative cost-push shocks. Austrian GDP responds positively in both scenarios, it is quite visible
that it is a plus to count with an additional instrument, namely the interest rate (pre-EMU). MP
is a useful device (materialized through an increasing the interest rate) to ease the expansion in
GDP. Again, hours worked mirror the behavior of GDP.
Finally, the row at the bottom of Figure 1 illustrates responses of government spending shocks
with origin in Austria, the government spending increases one percent (notice that we rescaled
the shock accordingly, because in (37) the shock distorts the government-to-GDP ratio). We ﬁnd
that Austrian output goes up equally in both subsamples, leading to crowding out of private
consumption, increasing investment and hours worked. EA’s output remains very close to the
steady state as well as consumption, investment and hours worked.
Next, in Figure 2 we illustrate IRFs with shocks originated in the EA. Brieﬂy, we highlight the
key diﬀerences with Figure 1. First, in the second row, notice that Austrian variables react very
similarly as those of the EA, which is not surprisingly because the MP is set by the ECB, beyond
the control of the OeNB. In addition, in the fourth row we observe that hours worked go up in
Austria in response to incentives to save that materialize because the MP is common (notice the
diﬀerent reaction of pre-EMU and EMU variables).
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates IRFs with shocks originated in the U.S.. Again, we concentrate
in diﬀerences with Figure 1. In the ﬁrst row, the reaction in output for the EMU period is more
pronounced that in the pre-EMU. In addition, in row 7, a shock in wage markup generates a
h u m p - s h a p e dr e a c t i o ni no u t p u tt h a ti st a l l e ri nt h eE M Up e r i o d( i nF i g u r e1i ti st h er e v e r s ef o r
Austria)
53Since the shock distorts investment decisions, the quadratic cost that quantiﬁes installation costs plays a key role.36
Figure 2: IRFs shocks with origin in the EA.37
Figure 3: IRFs shocks with origin in the U.S.38
9.2 Forecast error variance decomposition
The forecast error variance decomposition is reported in Tables 4 and 5 for horizons of 1 and 8
quarters.54 Note that rows in these tables represent ﬁgures in percentage points and the (horizontal)
sum adds up to one hundred. The general conclusion is that domestic shocks are quite important
drivers for output, consumption and wage inﬂation not only in Austria but also in the EA and
the U.S.. In contrast, foreign shocks are crucial for observed price inﬂation and observed nominal
interest rates. Comparing consumption and investment variability, and their causes it is observed
that Austrian business cycle is explained by foreign shocks to a greater extent than for the EA.
Beginning with Table 4, it is worth noticing particular countries’ results. Firstly, consider the
variability in Austrian GDP which to a large extent is driven by the MP shock regardless the
subsample considered (note that in the EMU regime the MP shock is shown in ‘foreign’ since it
originates in the EA). For output, also government shocks and technology shocks play key roles.
Notice that technology shocks are much more relevant in the EMU regime (twice as much for
the EA, by a factor of about 1.5 in Austria and the U.S.). Consumption ﬂuctuations are to
a large extent explained by preference shocks (more than 95 percent), displaying great stability
across regimes. Investment variability in Austria, as in the other countries, is largely explained
by investment shocks (the highest share is 45 percent for the EMU regime), followed by foreign
(EMU) and domestic MP policy (pre-EMU). To analyze inﬂation variability we must diﬀerentiate
both regimes. In eﬀect, in the pre-EMU all the countries display as main sources MP shocks (pre-
EMU), foreign and home technology shocks, which explain almost all the variability, whereas in
the EMU period, technology shocks are very important for Austria (nearly 50 percent). Moreover,
the labor eﬀort shock substantially triggers wage inﬂation variability, reaching 65 percent in the
EMU period. Other shocks worth mentioning are MP shocks (pre-EMU), technology shocks (in
both regimes) and foreign shocks (note that this is relevant only for Austria with shocks occurring
in the EA). Finally, the observed nominal interest rate variability (only available for the pre-EMU
regime) is mostly caused by MP and productivity shocks, while nearly 35 percent is caused by
foreign shocks.
The EA output has similar variability patterns as in Austria: the largest cause is the MP
shock that accounts for 43 and 34 percent of the variability in the pre-EMU and EMU regimes,
respectively. Moreover, to a lesser extent technology (specially in the EMU period), government
and investment shocks are also important sources of GDP ﬂuctuations. EA consumption variability
is largely explained by preference shocks, a result that is in line with Breuss & Rabitsch (2009).
Investment variability is triggered basically by investment, MP and technology shocks, whereas
foreign shocks explain about 12 percent of the variability. Moreover, inﬂation variability draws
heavily in MP and foreign shocks (pre-EMU) and technology shocks; however, there is a shift in
the EMU period: we observe that the MP shock from explaining 61 percent drops to 22 percent.
In addition, wage inﬂation variability is mostly (95 percent) caused by domestic shocks comprising
labor eﬀort, technology and MP shocks (this contrast with the sources of price inﬂation variability
largely explained by foreign shocks). Finally, the observed interest rate variability is roughly
explained by foreign shocks: 24 and 29 percent, in the pre-EMU and EMU periods, respectively.
The rest is explained by domestic shocks including MP and technology shocks (the latter in the
EMU period increases 50 percent).
Finally, consider the variability of U.S. observed variables. Regarding, output and consump-
tion, we observe negligible dependency of foreign shocks, whereas other domestic shocks such as
investment, productivity and MP are quite important in explaining GDP’s variability (percent-
ages remain quite stable in both regimes). Public expenditure is also important in the pre-EMU
regime. Moreover, the U.S. consumption is again heavily inﬂuenced by preference shocks. Re-
54Other horizons were calculated,  =4 , 12 and 30, though for space reasons are not reported.39
garding investment variability it is mainly caused by investment shocks (71 and 76 percent in the
pre-EMU regime and in the EMU regime, respectively), technology and foreign shocks trigger to
a large extent the remaining variability. Sources of U.S. inﬂation variability are very similar to
the ones reported above for the EA: three shocks explain the bulk of the variability, MP, foreign
and technology shocks. Wage inﬂation variance is largely explained by domestic shocks, we ﬁnd
that labor shock is very important, while technology and money demand shocks less important
but sizeable. Finally, sources of variability in U.S. interest rates are foreign shocks (26-30 percent),
technology, domestic MP shocks in that order of importance.
Table 5 presents the forecast variance decomposition for a forecast horizon of two years. Brieﬂy,
it points qualitatively to the same sources of ﬂuctuations as just described. There are noticeable
changes in some instances such as shares in investment shocks that explain investment variability
(a pattern that repeats in all three countries). Other rows of Tables 4 and 5 are very similar, e.g.
inﬂation and interest rate variability (all countries).40
Table 4: Forecast error variance decomposition, t+1
Country Shocks




 7.07 49.96 1.81 7.22 2.62 0.99 0.01 18.32 12.01
 
 12.69 3.30 10.14 1.39 1.48 0.00 27.51 43.48


 0.04 2.30 96.53 0.15 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.38

 0.16 98.82 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.71


 11.49 29.60 0.11 39.09 1.15 0.50 0.00 0.01 18.05

 12.82 0.02 44.89 0.31 0.56 0.00 0.04 41.36
Π

 16.74 46.63 0.06 0.03 0.23 1.17 0.00 0.02 35.11
Π
 47.93 0.26 0.06 0.82 2.38 0.00 0.09 48.46
Π

 11.30 24.53 5.29 0.95 49.32 0.10 0.24 1.35 6.92
Π
 3.54 9.32 0.47 65.77 0.01 0.30 0.73 19.86






 10.31 43.47 1.73 15.46 2.35 0.82 0.02 15.88 9.95
 
 21.18 34.17 0.91 10.11 2.30 2.16 0.05 18.88 10.23


 0.32 0.46 98.05 0.23 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.63

 0.40 0.58 97.76 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.79


 9.51 19.39 0.31 56.32 1.28 0.28 0.01 0.08 12.81

 16.90 24.55 0.49 43.49 1.27 0.77 0.02 0.16 12.36
Π

 11.62 61.39 0.23 0.16 0.90 0.53 0.01 0.10 25.05
Π
 33.73 22.36 0.54 0.20 1.53 2.01 0.02 0.27 39.34
Π

 14.35 29.02 6.36 1.56 43.54 0.03 0.22 1.52 3.41
Π
 22.46 11.47 7.68 1.05 49.87 0.07 0.49 1.91 5.01


 21.63 45.74 0.53 0.36 2.09 0.59 0.01 0.20 28.85





 21.35 22.78 1.49 24.93 1.86 0.59 0.00 19.71 7.27
 
 21.77 26.58 3.21 27.40 1.43 0.66 0.00 11.27 7.69


 0.28 1.46 97.09 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.45

 0.13 0.51 99.01 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17


 10.01 9.89 0.05 70.85 0.68 0.32 0.00 0.02 8.18

 7.56 9.58 0.04 76.25 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.00 5.84
Π

 24.98 40.91 0.04 0.22 0.44 1.70 0.00 0.04 31.67
Π
 26.88 32.61 0.20 0.41 0.62 1.08 0.00 0.02 38.17
Π

 16.14 14.72 1.47 2.79 60.97 0.08 0.12 1.08 2.63
Π
 23.56 6.39 3.88 2.53 59.55 0.12 0.17 0.41 3.38


 39.74 27.61 0.08 0.50 0.94 1.36 0.00 0.09 29.68

 35.55 35.29 0.30 0.59 0.92 1.01 0.00 0.04 26.3141
Table 5: Forecast error variance decomposition, t+8
Country Shocks




 5.63 43.03 4.84 8.64 5.56 0.69 0.01 18.11 13.48
 
 9.35 9.70 9.14 5.02 1.02 0.01 23.45 42.31


 0.05 3.97 93.22 0.42 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.79

 0.09 97.75 0.02 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.41


 8.13 22.96 0.26 52.21 2.10 0.34 0.01 0.02 13.98

 10.22 0.16 51.71 1.31 0.45 0.00 0.03 36.12
Π

 16.89 46.03 0.13 0.05 0.45 1.15 0.00 0.04 35.27
Π
 48.51 0.39 0.07 0.92 2.30 0.00 0.08 47.72
Π

 11.95 26.74 5.18 1.30 42.06 0.18 0.20 1.45 10.92
Π
 3.14 8.91 0.54 52.99 0.03 0.23 0.66 33.49






 9.50 37.00 3.06 17.64 2.85 0.69 0.04 18.52 10.69
 
 19.84 28.01 2.12 11.54 2.66 1.83 0.07 21.26 12.67


 0.51 0.83 94.41 0.95 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.82 2.17

 0.37 1.04 94.23 0.56 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.74 2.91


 7.21 14.42 0.42 65.46 1.19 0.21 0.01 0.21 10.87

 13.28 18.76 0.58 54.06 1.11 0.59 0.02 0.29 11.30
Π

 11.54 60.81 0.31 0.28 0.94 0.53 0.01 0.20 25.40
Π
 33.23 21.96 0.70 0.34 1.58 1.98 0.02 0.47 39.73
Π

 13.93 28.69 6.02 1.67 42.48 0.08 0.21 1.58 5.35
Π
 22.29 10.93 7.27 1.13 48.72 0.23 0.46 2.00 6.96


 21.18 43.48 1.04 0.99 2.71 0.55 0.02 0.69 29.34





 17.66 23.73 2.17 27.51 3.42 0.48 0.01 18.31 6.71
 
 18.71 25.02 5.45 28.80 3.37 0.53 0.01 9.92 8.18


 0.18 3.75 92.04 1.31 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.48

 0.08 1.02 97.57 0.09 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.74


 7.38 7.86 0.09 76.81 0.86 0.23 0.00 0.04 6.73

 6.03 7.55 0.08 80.13 0.70 0.22 0.00 0.00 5.28
Π

 25.10 40.45 0.06 0.31 0.55 1.69 0.00 0.05 31.80
Π
 26.54 32.02 0.30 0.47 1.01 1.06 0.00 0.03 38.57
Π

 17.25 16.97 1.39 3.28 55.11 0.17 0.10 1.04 4.69
Π
 26.86 6.90 4.01 3.08 52.67 0.29 0.15 0.41 5.62


 37.70 28.14 0.23 1.13 1.95 1.26 0.00 0.19 29.40

 34.56 34.18 0.65 0.87 2.28 0.95 0.01 0.06 26.46
9.3 Welfare implications
We calculate the welfare cost of the allocation supported in the estimated model, according to
Equation (64). The objective of this analysis provides us with a coherent indication of how far is42
the consumer from the eﬃcient allocation, though these results must be interpreted with care as
we stated in Footnote 52, on page 33. This utility gap, which is unobservable per se, is transformed
in terms of steady-state consumption. Thus, to interpret ﬁgures that appear in Table 6 we remark
that these are percentages of steady state consumption that nobody appropriates and is literally
lost. Which factors reduce that utility gap? Our model has several nominal as well as real rigidities,
which allow us to tackle the data. It is well known that if no rigidities were operative, our model
would be hardly distinguishable from classical models, where the welfare cost is zero and MP is
ineﬀective to boast aggregate demand (at any horizon). We analyze two scenarios: the ﬁrst one is
the benchmark model and the second one is a counterfactual, which assumes that nominal rigidities
(Calvo price and wage estimated parameters) are cut by 50 percent.
Beginning with the estimated model, Table 6 reports welfare costs under our two regimes. For
the pre-EMU period, the EA and Austria present welfare costs close to one percent of steady-state
consumption (-0.91 percent for Austria and -1.01 percent for the EA), whereas the U.S. welfare
costs is slightly higher: -1.52 percent of the steady-state consumption. As it is expect, in the second
subsample welfare costs in the EA decrease. This can be interpreted as favorable evidence that
indicate an improvement in the allocation during the EMU regime. The same result is obtained in
the U.S. although there was no change in regime. Surprisingly, the welfare cost observed for Austria
is higher; indicating that the typical consumer is worse oﬀ in terms of welfare. In particular, in the
case of Austria the increase represents almost 20 percent, reaching a welfare cost of -1.08 percent.
One explanation of these results might be that the EMU regime is characterized with data that
spans too shortly compared with the pre-EMU period.
What would be the eﬀect of a drop in nominal rigidities by 50 percent? This experiment is more
valuable as it might appear because all three countries’ welfare costs diminish. Why? Because a
drop in the Calvo price and wage parameters is equivalent to more ﬂexible pricing, therefore welfare
cost decreases. In the EMU subsample, welfare costs are lower for all countries and Austria drops
more than the EA, which is an interesting result. Likewise, in the EMU regime welfare costs go
down more than in the EA. However, as the U.S. welfare cost reduces in the second regime as well,
its use as a ‘control’ country is dubious. To make a fair comparison we normalize the welfare cost
of Austria and EA in terms of the one observed for the U.S.. As a result, it becomes evident that
the relative welfare cost of Austria and EA increas e( d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a ti nt h eE A ,i td e c r e a s e d
in absolute values).
Table 6: Conditional welfare costs in terms of steady state consumption
Country All shocks Relative to the U.S.
Estimated rigidities Calvo param. ↓ 50% Estimated rigidities Calvo param. ↓ 50%
pre-EMU EMU pre-EMU EMU pre-EMU EMU pre-EMU EMU
AT -0.9103 -1.0855 -0.7110 -0.9191 0.598 1.109 0.527 1.07
EA -1.0138 -0.8293 -0.9281 -0.8003 0.666 0.848 0.688 0.931
US -1.5226 -0.9784 -1.3493 -0.8588
10 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a three-country DSGE model of the Austrian economy, an aggregate
that accounts for the EA and the U.S. The model is estimated employing Bayesian methods on
quarterly data covering the period from 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q4. That sample includes what is known
as the ‘Great Moderation’ period widely studied for the U.S. Our main ﬁndings are summarized
as follows. The sample is divided in two periods, namely, the pre-EMU and EMU regimes because
of the evidence on diﬀerent modes of the Austria and EA reported by Breuss & Rabitsch (2009).43
The model is approximated up to the ﬁrst order and the (linear) Kalman ﬁlter is employed to
evaluate the likelihood. Further, Bayesian estimates reparameterize the model which is simulated
employing second order approximation to the policy function. As a result we obtain IRFs, variance
decompositions, FEVD and we calculate welfare costs.
Analyzing the FEVD, the general conclusion is that domestic shocks matter a lot for output
and consumption in Austria as well as in the foreign countries; and in contrast, foreign shocks
are important for observed price inﬂation and observed nominal interest rates. Furthermore, wage
inﬂation variability is also explained fundamentally by domestic shocks. Comparing consumption
and investment variability, for Austria and the EMU foreign shocks trigger more the former than
the latter.
Our estimates of welfare costs under the two regimes are similar to the obtained in the literature.
For the pre-EMU period, EA and Austria present welfare costs around one percent of steady-state
consumption (-0.91 percent for the Austria and -1.01 percent for the EA), whereas the U.S. welfare
cost is -1.52 percent. In the second subsample, the Austrian welfare cost is the only one that
increases; in the case of the EA and the U.S. these drop to -0.83 and -0.98 percent, respectively.
Also when compared with the U.S., it becomes evident that relative welfare cost of Austria and
EA increase (despite in the EA, it decreased in absolute values).
We ﬁnd interesting areas of further research such as the addition of exporters as a group to
study the relevance of pass-through, the introduction of asset markets that are incomplete due to
transaction costs derived from imperfect information when investment abroad and the evaluation
of diﬀerent policy rules in terms of welfare.44
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Consumer’s problem
Results presented in Section 3.1 implicitly draw on the Lagrangian for the consumer’s problem.







































































































































































































































Considering the utility function given in Equation (4) we derive the following partial derivatives
with respect to consumption, money balances, labor supply (in the case of competitive labor

























































































































































































































































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
Diﬀerentiation w.r.t. ˜ 
















































+ (1 − 
)S


























































+ (1 − 
)S





























































































To derive real optimal wages f 

 ≡ ˜ 

 , so that the numerator of Equation (80)




 multiplies its denominator. Since Λ1
+ = ˜ Λ1
+[+] and





























































































































































































































































ﬁnally, multiplying and dividing the RHS by []

 and introducing them into the summation to

















































The consumer derives utility from a bundle of consumption goods. Given this reference bundle,
the representative consumer optimally allocates goods’ varieties such that the expenditure is min-
imized. Throughout all this subsection we drop the -subindex because there are no dynamics
involved in the subsequent problems. It should be noticed that the tax eﬀect is irrelevant because
(1 + ) applies to all varieties and aggregates –consumption and investment–, the same applies
to all intratemporal problems in this section).
A.2.1 Private consumption





0 , for all
 ∈ [01].55 In addition, we assume that the country  consumption shares are distributed in the
unit interval as follows:
+––––––––—+–––––––––-+–––––––––-+
1 2 1 − (1 + 2)







0  st. (19).

















































































































































































55If the law of one price would apply, 0 = 000.T h e p r i c e 0 i si n t e r p r e t e da st h ep r i c eq u o t e di nc o u n t r y or an














































































































































































































































 1 + 2
1−


















 1 + 2
1−















ﬁnally, by deﬁnition of price index, 1−




(1 − 1 − 2)(00)
1−
,






































where the denominator, is a trade-weighted domestic price index for -country imports and home






















ﬁnally, the imports demand of  from 00 is given by:










In a -country model, there are  bilateral net trade ﬂows; however,  − 1 of them are
independent because the world economy is "closed". Likewise, there are  bilateral terms of trade
and  bilateral real exchange rates; however, only  − 1 are independent. In our three country




















00). Let us deﬁne , 0, 00 between brackets denote a typical variety produced in countries , 0
and 00, respectively.
























Similarly, for imported varieties from country 0 ∈ : min
(0)
R 0













,w h e r e(0) is the price of the variety 0 placed in country  (if
the LOOP applies, then (0)=0(0) and (00)=00(00)). Let us solve these problems






























which yield the following FOCs:













































































 = (˘ )
1



























































































()(); as a result, we obtain Equation (24) in the main text. Substituting it into





(), yields (˘ ), but for symmetry and given the inﬁnite
























































































































































































which can be solved in a similar way as the intratemporal consumer problem, yielding the govern-









A.2.3 Relative consumption price aggregates






























































A.3.1 Cost minimization (static)
The static cost minimization problem can be stated as the following Lagrangian (recall that the































¢−1  = 



































































































































































































































































where  does not depend on ﬁrm ’s output; therefore, we drop the upper index in the main
text.55
A.3.2 Intertemporal problem: Calvo pricing
As stated in the main text, the proﬁt of the home ﬁrm that serves the domestic market is given
by Equation (46), subject an aggregated version of the domestic demand Equation (45), that ﬁrm
 must serve. Moreover, the discount factor that should be taken into account is derived form












;( t h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m
assures that all returns at the optimum are the same, so we disregards foreign bonds because they

































f r o mw h e r ew ed e r i v et h ef o l l o w i n gF O C : 56

⎡




























































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
equalizing it to zero, introducing the summation and the expectations operator, and then sending





























































Finally the optimal price quoted domestically to buy the home variety , ˜ 


















































w h e r ew ed e ﬁne the relevant markup as  ≡

(−1) and S
 stands for a lump-sum subsidy, when
greater than one, that exactly neutralizes the markup. This is an artifact to replicate an scenario
where the monopolistic distortion is corrected by the government employing ﬁscal policy.
To derive the (relative) real optimal price,c o n s i d e r˜ 
 () g i v e nb yE q u a t i o n( 9 0 )a n dd e ﬁne





 .G i v e n t h e f a c t t h a t Λ1
+ = ˜ Λ1
++ (this allows us to
pin down real marginal costs in the numerator and gross inﬂation in the denominator, since it is











































56Note that our Cobb-Douglas production function leads to a marginal cost function Equation (88) that does not depend on output,
so that  has no arguments.56



























































































































































Before advancing in the exporters sectors’ pricing, notice that country 0 demands for imports


































































For simplicity in the main text we made the assumption that the LOOP applies so that the price
paid in the foreign country of a home good is just the domestic price multiplied by the relevant
nominal exchange rate. This implies that what applied between braces both in the numerator
and denominator of (91) can be replaced by  
+()+ which comes from the equilibrium
condition (supply equals demands, domestic and foreign). Of course,  
+() is taken from the
production function (40).57
A.4 Wages dispersion
To derive the nominal average wage dispersion, consider Equation (62) in the main text. It follows
that:














































































































integrating over  yields:
˜ ∆ = 
1+

















































































































s i n c ew ee m p l o yd e ﬁnitions of ˇ  ≡
˜ 
 and Π.R e p l a c i n g∆ into ˜ ∆ above yields:
˜ ∆ = 
1+





Likewise, we can derive prices dispersion and ﬁnally obtain Equation (56). We omit this derivation
as it is parallel as for wage dispersion. Here we aim at obtaining the real version of (56). To do



















































gives the real version of Equation (56) in the main text, where we assumed that there are no
exporters.